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Abstract
We analyze whether relative risk aversion varies with wealth. We first derive the-
oretical predictions on how risky shares respond to wealth fluctuations in a portfolio
choice model with both external habits and time-varying labor income. Our analytical
results indicate that: (1) for each household, there are two channels through which the
risky share responds to wealth fluctuations, the habit channel and the income channel;
(2) across households, there are heterogeneous responses through the habit channel:
those who experience large negative income shocks reduce their share of risky assets;
and (3) two potential mis-identification problems arise when both the heterogeneity
in responses through the habit channel and the income channel are ignored. We then
test the theoretical predictions with data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Contrary to the existing literature, our empirical results show evidence of relative risk
aversion varying with wealth over time after correcting those two mis-identification
problems.
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1 Introduction
The assumption that agent’s relative risk aversion varies with wealth is appealing because
it provides an important mechanism that helps explain numerous economic phenomena.
One popular way of generating time-varying relative risk aversion (hereafter TVRRA) with
wealth is to assume habit formation preferences. Macroeconomic models with habit forma-
tion preferences have been used to explain a variety of stylized macroeconomic facts that are
hard to explain using theoretical models with standard constant relative risk aversion prefer-
ences. These facts include the equity premium [see, Constantinides (1990), Jermann (1998),
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Boldrin et al. (2001), and others], the excess sensitivity of
consumption to income [see, for example, Boldrin et al. (2001)], the equity home bias [see,
among others, Shore and White (2002)], the hump-shaped response of aggregate variables to
monetary shocks [Fuhrer (2000), Uribe (2002), Christiano et al. (2005)], and countercyclical
markups [Ravn et al. (2006)]. However, despite the mounting literature that uses habit for-
mation preferences, thus automatically embodying a TVRRA assumption, there are only a
few papers that test the theoretical implications of TVRRA with micro-data.
In this paper, we derive theoretical predictions of TVRRA on the relation between risky
shares and wealth and test these predictions with data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). To derive the theoretical predictions between risky shares and wealth,
we build a discrete-time portfolio choice model with external habits and time-varying labor
income.1 Our emphasis on time-varying labor income is motivated by two empirical facts of
the PSID data. Fact 1: the majority of households in the PSID data receive labor income.
And Fact 2: a large portion of households in the PSID data experience large income shocks.
For example, about 40% of the households in the sample received income below 30% of their
1We generate TVRRA by assuming habits. Thus, we test the theoretical predictions of TVRRA by
examining how risky shares respond to wealth fluctuations through the habit channel. Here the habit
channel means the response of risky shares to wealth simply because of the existing of habit. We provide a
mathematical presentation of the habit channel in Section 2.3.1.
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average income over time.2 Our model with time-varying labor income captures those two
empirical observations in the data. Mostly importantly, our model modifies the existing
theoretical predictions about the relation between risky shares and wealth in a non-trivial
way, which we will discuss below.
Our first contribution is theoretical. We establish the theoretical predictions of TVRRA
on the relation between risky shares and wealth. Our theoretical predictions are different
from the existing prediction which argues that, when it becomes richer, the household will
increase its risky share if the household has decreasing relative risk aversion in wealth [Brun-
nermeier and Nagel (2008)]. Instead, our analytical solution changes such a conventional
prediction in two dimensions. First, our closed-form solution suggests that for each house-
hold its risky share responds to wealth fluctuations through two channels: the habit channel
and the income channel. When the household does not experience large negative income
shocks, the risky share, as wealth accumulates, will increase through the habit channel and
decrease through the income channel.3 Thus, a mis-identification problem may arise when
the response through both the habit channel and the income channel is ascribed to the re-
sponse through the habit channel alone. We call this an internal mis-identification problem.
The second bias arises due to the heterogeneity in households’ income shocks. Specifically,
households with large income drops are likely to decrease their risky shares responding to
wealth accumulations through the habit channel, while households without large negative
income shocks will increase their risky shares through that channel when they become richer.
Thus, households who have decreasing relative risk aversion in wealth may adjust their risky
shares to wealth fluctuations in opposite ways in the presence of heterogenous income shocks.
As a result, an external mis-identification problem may arise when estimating over samples
in which heterogenous households are pooled together.
Our second contribution is empirical. We show strong evidence of TVRRA which is in line
2Section 4.1.1 provides more details.
3We show this point analytically in Section 2.3.1.
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with the theoretical predictions. To facilitate the discussion, we define three different forms
of TVRRA implications (hereafter TVRRAI): the strong form, the semi-strong form, and the
weak form.4 If the portfolio choice model with habits considers neither the aforementioned
two channels for each household, nor the aforementioned heterogeneous responses through
the habit channel across households, we label the key theoretical implication(s) from such
a model as the strong form of TVRRAI. The strong form implies that households whose
preferences could be represented by habit formation will, independent of their income flows,
increase their risky shares when their wealth increases, as discussed in Brunnermeier and
Nagel (2008). If the portfolio choice model with habits considers the two channels but
ignores the heterogeneity, we label the key theoretical implication(s) from such a model as
the semi-strong form of TVRRAI. The semi-strong form implies that after controlling for
the response through the income channel, the response through the habit channel should be
positive. At last, if the portfolio choice model with habits considers both the two channels
and the heterogeneity, we label the key theoretical implication(s) from such a model as the
weak form of TVRRAI. The weak-form implies that after controlling for the response through
the income channel and the impact of large negative income shocks, the response through
the habit channel in the group in which households experienced large negative income shocks
should be lower than that in the other group in which households did not experience large
negative income shocks.
We empirically test the semi-strong form and the weak form of TVRRAI and compare the
results with the strong form tested in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). We find evidence of
the weak-form of TVRRAI and no evidence of the semi-strong form of TVRRAI. First, in the
semi-strong form of TVRRAI, the identification scheme builds on a model that does consider
the two channels but ignores the heterogeneity so that the test corrects the internal but not
the external mis-identification problem, our estimates are statistically insignificant. This
contrasts to Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), who test the strong-form of TVRRAI and find
4When a model imposes less restrictions, we say the derived theoretical implication is stronger.
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significant negative responses. This comparison is in line with our theory, which states that
controlling for the response through the income channel will increase the estimated response
through the habit channel.5 Second, in the weak form of TVRRAI, if the identification
scheme builds on a model that considers both the two channels and the heterogeneity so
that the test corrects both the internal and the external mis-identification problems, our
estimates are both economically and statistically significant. We consider our empirical
results as strong and clear evidence of TVRRA. Furthermore, our empirical results highlight
the importance of isolating the impacts of time-varying labor income in carrying out empirical
tests of time-varying relative risk aversion.
Our paper is related to several strands of the existing literature. First, our paper con-
tributes to the literature about the impact of habit formation preferences on households’
portfolio choices. Existing theoretical models with habit formation that abstract from labor
income imply a positive relation between wealth and risky shares [Constantinides (1990),
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), etc.]. Our theoretical contribution here is that we show,
analytically, how labor income affects such a relation. On the empirical side, Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2008), on the contrary, find a negative relation between risky shares and wealth
in the data. Our empirical contribution here is that we show that estimates which ignore the
two aforementioned mis-identification problems are likely to be biased down as is predicted
in our theory. Put together, by carefully controlling for the impact of labor income on the
relation between risky shares and wealth, we provide a mechanism that is able to reconcile
the seeming conflict between the existing theoretical predictions of TVRRA from a model
with habit formation preferences and the existing empirical findings.6
Second, our paper is related to the existing studies that test key theoretical predictions
5We show this point analytically in Section 2.3.1.
6It is worth mentioning that our mechanism is one of many possible ones that may be able to reconcile
the seeming conflict. For example, one mechanism could be to control for the impact of inertia in portfolio
adjustments as proposed in Calvet et al. (2009). They estimate the Brunnermeier–Nagel regression on their
Swedish data set, with which they can control for inertia, and they find a positive relation when they estimate
the regression by instrumental variables.
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implied by habit using micro-data, which find mixed evidence of habit formation preferences.
For example, Dynan (2000) rejects habit preference using US consumption data and Chiap-
pori and Paiella (2011) reject habit preference using Italian data. On the contrary, Ravina
(2007) provides evidence of habit persistence in household consumption choices using panel
data on U.S. credit-card account holders. Carrasco et al. (2007) estimate the intra-temporal
marginal rate of substitution using Spanish consumption panel data and find strong sup-
port of habit. Cappelletti (2012) uses Italian data and finds that, after controlling for the
decision to enter and leave the risky asset market, wealth fluctuations do help to explain
changes in portfolio allocations. Recently, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) investigate how
households’ portfolio allocations change in response to wealth fluctuations and find a nega-
tive link between risky shares and wealth, a finding which may be interpreted as evidence
of a combination of the lack of TVRRA and the inertia in portfolio adjustments. Calvet
et al. (2009) estimate the Brunnermeier–Nagel regression on Swedish data and find a positive
relation after controlling for inertia.
Lastly, our paper is also related to the literature on how income affects households’
portfolio choices. For example, Wachter and Yogo (2010) show in a life-cycle model that
risky shares fall in normalized cash-on-hand (which corresponds to wealth in our paper)
and rises in permanent income even if households have decreasing relative risk aversion in
wealth. Our results instead indicate that the impact of temporary income also matters in
terms of theoretical predictions of TVRRA on the relation between risky shares and wealth.
First of all, our results show that controlling for the impact through the income channel may
help explain the negative link found in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). Second, further
controlling for the heterogeneous responses through the habit channel across households
provides us evidence of TVRRA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and provides
testable implications. Section 3 briefly explains the data, variables, and the sample selection.
Section 4 presents the empirical results on both the weak form of TVRRAI and the semi-
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strong Form of TVRRAI. And Section 5 concludes.
2 Model, Solution, Biases, and Testable Implications
In this section, we present the benchmark model, derive the analytic solution to risky share,
discuss the importance of time-varying income, and derive testable implications of TVRRA.
The theoretical model is a highly stylized portfolio choice model with a time-varying la-
bor income and external habits. We consider the model for several reasons. First, the
model delivers clear testable predictions of TVRRA on how risky shares respond to wealth
fluctuations. Second, our model captures the realistic feature that the majority of the US
households do receive time-varying labor income. Third, the majority of macroeconomics
models, if they assume habit formation preferences, contain these two elements.
2.1 The Benchmark Model
In this model, a household carries wealth, Wt, from the last period, and receives labor income,
Yt, in the current period. Note that the household receives time-varying labor income in our
model. This is different from the model in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) in which there is
no labor income. The household chooses consumption Ct and the share of wealth Wt+Yt−Ct
invested in the risky asset, αt, to maximize
max
{Ct, αt}∞t=0
U = E
∞∑
t=0
δt
(Ct −X)1−σ
1− σ ,
where E denotes the unconditional expectation operator, δ denotes the subjective discount
factor, and X denotes the external habit. It is worth mentioning that there are many
functional forms to choose to represent habits. We choose the simplest form that enables us
to generate time-varying relative risk aversion implications on how risky shares respond to
wealth fluctuations. Alternatively, X can be interpreted as a constant subsistence level or
a consumption commitment as in Chetty and Szeidl (2007). In Section 2.2.2, we show that
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when habits do not change dramatically over time, time-varying external habits do not bring
much additional insight about how habit formation preferences affect the relation between
risky shares and wealth. For this very reason and given that we focus on how income affects
the relation between risky shares and wealth, we assume constant, instead of time-varying,
external habits in the benchmark model.
In order to obtain the analytical solution, we make the following assumption on labor
income
(Yt+1 − Y ) = κ (Yt − Y ) , (2.1)
where Y denotes the steady state of labor income. κ is a parameter whose value is within
(−1, 1). Our specification modifies the standard assumption that income follows an AR(1)
process. Such a process enables us, when there is no uncertainty in the income process, to
derive a close-form solution, which will deliver clear theoretical predictions.
The household can invest in two securities: a risky asset with return Rt and a risk-free
asset with return Rf . As a result, the household’s wealth at the beginning of period t+ 1 is
given by
Wt+1 = (1 +Rp,t+1) (Wt + Yt − Ct) ,
where Rp,t+1 = αt (Rt −Rf ) +Rf denotes the return to the household’s wealth portfolio.
2.2 The Analytical Solution
It is not straightforward to derive the analytical solution to the risky share in our model.
The key idea behind the strategy to derive the analytical solution is as follows: transform
the original model into one which has an analytical solution; and back up the solution to
the risky share in the original model since both the original model and the transformed
model should have the same amount of wealth invested in the risky asset. To successfully
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implement this strategy, we need to impose additional restrictions such as Eq. (2.1). With
some additional restrictions and by following four steps, we derive the analytical solution to
the risky share in our benchmark model.
2.2.1 Step 1: Adding A Fixed Labor Income Flow
In this step, we introduce a constant labor income flow and a constant external habit into
Samuelson (1969). We define this model as Model 1. The household’s optimization problem
becomes to choose Ct and the share of Wt−Ct+Y invested in the risky asset, α1t , to maximize
max
{Ct, α1t }
U = E
∞∑
t=0
δt
(Ct −X)1−γ
1− γ ,
s.t. Wt+1 = (1 +Rp,t+1) (Wt − Ct + Y ) .
To derive the solution, we first divide the total household post-consumption wealth into two
parts: Wt + Y − Ct − X−YRf and X−YRf . For the first part, the household invests a fraction
α˜1t in the risky asset and the rest in the risk-free asset. The return to this (partial) wealth
portfolio, Wt+Y −Ct− X−YRf , is then given by R˜1p,t+1 = α˜1t (Rt −Rf )+Rf . The second part,
the remaining X−Y
Rf
, is 100% invested in the risk-free asset. The law of motion of wealth is
given by
Wt+1 =
(
1 + R˜1p,t+1
)(
Wt − Ct + Y − X − Y
Rf
)
+ (1 +Rf )
X − Y
Rf
.
To transform the model, we then define some auxiliary variables: W˜ 1t = Wt−(X−Y )− X−YRf
and C˜1t = Ct −X. With the auxiliary variables, Model 1 can be rewritten as
max
{C˜1t , α˜1t }∞t=0
U = E
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
C˜1t
)1−γ
1− γ ,
s.t. W˜ 1t+1 =
(
1 + R˜1p,t+1
)(
W˜ 1t − C˜1t
)
.
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The transformed model is identical to the one studied in Samuelson (1969). Under the
condition that the expected returns and volatility are constant, the share of the risky asset,
α˜1∗t , to the above transformed optimization problem is constant [Samuelson (1969)], and it
is 1, that is α˜1∗t = α ≈ 1.
Finally, since both Model 1 and the transformed one give the same answer to the amount
of wealth invested in the risky asset, it is true that
α1∗t (Wt − Ct + Y ) = α˜1∗t ×
(
Wt − Ct + Y − X − Y
Rf
)
⇒ α1∗t = α˜1∗t ×
Wt − Ct + Y − X−YRf
Wt − Ct + Y ≈ 1−
X − Y
(Wt − Ct + Y )Rf .
In particular, if we set Yt = 0, we will get the same model as in Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2008) and the solution to the risky share, α1t , will be simplified to
α1∗t = α
[
1− X
(Wt − Ct)Rf
]
≈ 1− X
(Wt − Ct)Rf , (2.2)
This is also the same as that in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008).
2.2.2 Step 2: Time-varying Habits
In this step, we allow time-varying habits and set Yt = 0 in the benchmark model. By doing
so, we obtain Model 2. In this case, the household’s optimization problem is to maximize
max
{Ct, α2t }∞t=0
U = E
∞∑
t=0
δt
(Ct −Xt)1−γ
1− γ ,
s.t. Wt+1 = (1 +Rp,t+1) (Wt − Ct) ,
To obtain an analytical solution, we impose the following restrictions on habits
(Xt+1 −X) = η (Xt −X) .
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Even though our specification is restrictive, such a process enables us to derive the close-form
solution.
We then divide the total household post-consumption wealth into two parts: Wt − Ct −
Xt−X
Z+Rf
and Xt−X
Z+Rf
, where Z =
1+Rf
η
− (1 + Rf ). In the first part, the household invests a
fraction α˜2t in the risky asset and the rest in the risk-free asset. The return to this (partial)
wealth portfolio is R˜2p,t+1 = α˜
2
t (Rt −Rf ) + Rf . The second part, the remaining Xt−XZ+Rf , is
100% invested in the risk-free asset. The law of motion of wealth can thus be written as
Wt+1 =
(
1 + R˜2p,t+1
)(
Wt − Ct − Xt −X
Z +Rf
)
+ (1 +Rf )
Xt −X
Z +Rf
,
=
(
1 + R˜2p,t+1
){
Wt − (Xt −X)− Xt −X
Z +Rf
− [Ct − (Xt −X)]
}
+
Z + 1 +Rf
Z +Rf
(Xt+1 −X) .
Third, we define some auxiliary variables: W˜ 2t = Wt−(Xt−X)−Xt−XZ+Rf and C˜2t = Ct−Xt+X.
And Model 2 can be rewritten as
max
{C˜2t , α˜2t }∞t=0
= E
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
C˜2t −X
)1−γ
1− γ ,
s.t. W˜ 2t+1 =
(
1 + R˜2p,t+1
)(
W˜ 2t − C˜2t
)
.
This transformed model is the same as the special case of Model 1 when Y = 0. As is shown
in Eq. (2.2), the share of the risky asset in the transformed model is given by
α˜2∗t = α
1− X(
W˜ 2t − C˜2t
)
Rf
 ≈ 1− X(
Wt − Ct − Xt−XZ+Rf
)
Rf
,
where the approximation sign comes from α ≈ 1.
Finally, since the original model and the transformed model should have the same solution
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to the amount of wealth invested in risky assets, we have
α2∗t (Wt − Ct) = α˜2∗t
(
W˜ 2t − C˜2t
)
= α˜2∗t
[
(Wt − Ct)− Xt −X
Z +Rf
]
.
And the solution to the risky share in Model 2 is given by
α2∗t =
1− X(
Wt − Ct − Xt−XZ+Rf
)
Rf
[1− Xt −X
(Wt − Ct) (Z +Rf )
]
. (2.3)
From Eq. (2.3), the necessary and sufficient condition for the last term,
[
1− Xt−X
(Wt−Ct)(Z+Rf )
]
,
to be positive, is ((Xt −X) < (Wt − Ct) ∗ (Z +Rf )). That is to say, in the case that habits
do not dramatically deviate above from the mean, we have the conventional wisdom: house-
holds with habit formation preferences will increase their risky shares when they accumulate
wealth. This is the same theoretical prediction as in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) which
assume time-invariant habits. In other words, allowing time-varying habits will not fun-
damentally change the positive prediction in the literature if habits move slowly around
the mean. For this reason, we do not impose any additional restriction in our regression
equations to control for the time-varying habits. However, if Xt is far above X, it becomes
possible the response of risky shares to wealth accumulations through the habit channel
becomes negative. It seems intuitive to argue that the chance that the response becomes
negative increases over longer time horizons.
2.2.3 Step 3: Time-varying Labor Income and Fixed Habits
With all the results we have obtained in steps 1–2, we are now ready to derive the analytical
solution to the risky share in the benchmark model. To proceed, we define X˜3t = X − Yt,
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X˜3 = X − Y , and C˜3t = Ct − Yt. We obtain
X˜3t+1 − X˜3 = κ
(
X˜3t − X˜3
)
,
Ct −X = C˜3t + Yt −X = C˜3t − X˜3t .
And we can transform the benchmark model into a model without income but with time-
varying habits
max
{C˜3t ,α˜3t }∞t=0
U = E
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
C˜3t − X˜3t
)1−γ
1− γ ,
s.t. W˜ 3t+1 =
(
1 + R˜3p,t+1
)(
W˜ 3t − C˜3t
)
.
where W˜ 3t+1 = Wt+1 and W˜
3
t = Wt. This transformed model is the same model as Model 2
and the law of motion of X˜3t is also the same as the one imposed in Model 2. Thus, Under
the condition that expected return and the standard deviation of Rt are constant and there
are no income shocks, i.e., ηt ≡ 0, the solution to the risky share in the transformed model
is given by
α˜3∗t =
1− X˜3(
W˜ 3t − C˜3t − X˜
3
t−X˜3
Z+Rf
)
Rf
1− X˜3t − X˜3(
W˜ 3t − C˜3t
)
(Z +Rf )
 ,
where Z is defined as Z =
1+Rf
κ
− (1 +Rf ).
Finally, since the original model and the transformed model should have the same solution
to the amount of wealth invested in risky assets, we have the following
α∗t (Wt − Ct + Yt) = α˜3∗t
(
W˜ 3t − C˜3t
)
⇒ α∗t = α˜3∗t ,
⇒ α∗t =
1− X − Y(
Wt − Ct + Yt + Yt−YZ+Rf
)
Rf
[1 + Yt − Y
(Wt − Ct + Yt) (Z +Rf )
]
. (2.4)
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Equation (2.4) provides an analytical solution that enables us to discuss how the risky share
responds to post consumption wealth and how time-varying labor income and habits affect
the response.
2.3 Biases and Two Mis-identifications
In this section, we show that estimates of habit may be biased down if time varying labor
income is ignored. This is because in this case, those estimates are subject to two mis-
identification problems.
2.3.1 Two Channels and An Internal Mis-identification
For each household, its risky share responds to its wealth accumulation through two channels,
the habit channel and the income channel. A mis-identification problem arises when the
response through two channels is ascribed as the response through the habit channel. We
label this mis-identification problem as the internal mis-identification problem. To see this,
we set Yt ≡ Y and Eq. (2.4) reduces to
α∗t =
[
1− X
(Wt − Ct + Y )Rf
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The habit channel:+
+
[
Y
(Wt − Ct + Y )Rf
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The income channel:−
. (2.5)
The sign “+” (“-”) means that the risky share will increase (decrease) when the post-
consumption wealth increases. It is clear that α∗t respond to the change of Wt − Ct in
two channels: the habit channel (“+”) and the income channel (“-”).7 Intuitively, adding
a constant stream of labor income in case of a constant habit is mathematically isomorphic
(in terms of the asset allocation implications) to reducing the habit by a constant. As a
result, ignoring the impact of labor income will bias down the estimates that are used to
7One thing worth mentioning is, even though α∗t is decreasing in post consumption wealth through the
second channel, ∂α∗t /∂Y is still positive: the higher labor income the household has, the larger the α
∗ will
be.
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make judgment about the time-varying relative risk aversion implications.
From Eq. (2.5), we obtain the following core regression equation
∆α∗t ≈ (ρ− θY ) ∆wt + εt, (2.6)
where ∆ denotes the first-order difference, ρ = XW
(W+Y )2Rf
and θ = W
(W+Y )2Rf
where W denotes
the average of wealth, wt ≡ log (Wt − Ct), and εt follows identical, independent, normal
distribution and is uncorrelated with ∆wt. ρ is the parameter that catches the response of
risky shares to wealth fluctuations through the habit channel. The detail is in Appendix 6.1.
If we remove labor income from the previous model, i.e., ignoring the impact of income
on the relation, the core regression equation and the corresponding ordinary least squares
(hereafter OLS) estimate are, respectively, given by
∆αt ≈ ρ∆wt + εt,
ρ˜ =
[
(∆wt)
′ (∆wt)
]−1
(∆wt)
′ (∆αt) .
However, if Eq. (2.6) is correctly specified, we will have
E (ρ˜) =
[
(∆wt)
′ (∆wt)
]−1
(∆wt)
′ (ρ− θY ) ∆wt = ρ− θY ≤ ρ. (2.7)
Thus a mis-identification problem will arise when the estimate of (ρ− θY ) is ascribed as
the estimate of ρ. From Eq. (2.7), if labor income has a strong impact, i.e., θY is large, ρ˜,
may be close to zero or negative even though the true value of ρ is still positive. Thus, the
fact that ρ˜ is close to zero or negative does not necessarily imply that micro-data does not
support the TVRRA assumption, because it does not necessarily mean that ρ is negative or
zero. Put it differently, ignoring the response through the income channel biases down the
estimate of ρ.
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2.3.2 Heterogeneity and An External Mis-identification
Households with different income shocks may be heterogenous in terms of the responses of
their risky shares to wealth fluctuations through the habit channel. When households do not
have large negative income shocks, they increase their risky shares as the optimal response
to wealth accumulations through the habit channel. However, when households have large
negative income shocks, they may decrease their risky shares as the optimal response to
wealth accumulations through the habit channel. To see the heterogenous responses, note
that when Y is time-varying, the response of α∗t through the habit channel is given by
α
1− X(
Wt − Ct + Yt + Yt−YZ+Rf
)
Rf
[1 + Yt − Y
(Wt − Ct + Yt) (Z +Rf )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The habit channel
. (2.8)
Expression (2.8) shows that if Yt is far below Y , it is likely that the sum in the second
parenthesis becomes negative. This implies that the response through the habit channel can
be negative. In this case, the conventional wisdom, that risky shares are increasing in wealth
through the habit channel, may break down in the presence of large negative income shocks.
Thus, there could be two different groups of households. Households in the first group
have large negative income shocks and respond negatively, in terms of adjusting their risky
shares, to wealth accumulations through the habit channel. Households in the second group
do not have large negative income shocks and they respond positively. If we run regressions
with a sample that pools the two heterogenous groups together, the associated estimate is
mis-identified and it is likely to be insignificant. We label this mis-identification problem as
the external mis-identification problem.
2.4 Testable Predictions
We have shown that incorporating time-varying labor income matters in terms of identifica-
tion. We now derive empirical tests of the theoretical predictions of TVRRA by controlling
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the response through the income channel for each household and/or the heterogeneous re-
sponses through the habit channel across households, i.e., testing the weak form and the
semi-strong form of TVRRAI.
2.4.1 Weak Form of TVRRAI
Given the aforementioned internal and external mis-identification problems, we design the
following test to examine the weak form of TVRRAI. We divide households in each subsample
into two groups: households in the first group, i = 1, experienced large negative income
shocks and households in the second group, i = 2, did not experience large negative income
shocks. Second, for each group, we obtain an estimate of ρi, i = 1, 2. Third, our testable
hypothesis for habit formation preference is,
ρ2 − ρ1 > 0. (2.9)
Instead of imposing ρ2 > ρ1 > 0, we test the difference of ρ’s across groups in each sub-
sample. The main reason for not testing ρi > 0 is as follows. As we have discussed in
Section 2.2.2, when Xt dramatically deviates from its mean, the response of risky shares to
wealth fluctuations through the habit channel would be negative even if households have not
experienced large negative income shocks. In our empirical exercise, the test of the weak
form of TVRRAI uses the k = 5 subsample.8 During the five-year interval between any two
observations for each household, it is possible that habits have changed a lot. Because of this
consideration of large changes of habits over 5 years, we test Inequality (2.9). Nevertheless,
our testable hypothesis will still be reasonable in this case as long as habits across households
change roughly in the same fashion over time.
8The notation of k = 5 means that any two observations for the same household in the sample are 5 years
apart. We explain in detail in Section 3.
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2.4.2 Semi-strong Form of TVRRAI
Given the internal mis-identification problem, we run regression to obtain the estimates of
the response through the habit channel, ρ. We consider the following testable hypothesis to
test the semi-strong form of TVRRAI
ρ > 0. (2.10)
Mathematically, without considering the impact of large negative income shocks (or as in the
case of Yt ≡ Y ), our analysis in Section 2.3.1 indicates that X > 0 implies that ρ > 0. That
is to say, a positive estimate of ρ suggests that habit formation preferences are in line with
portfolio choice data. This is the same as in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008): intuitively, an
increase in wealth, for example, should lead to a temporary decrease in relative risk aversion
and an increase of the risky share if households have habit formation preferences.
3 Variables, Data, and Sample Selection
Here we give a brief introduction about variables, data, and sampling. Variables are defined
in the standard way. In particular, risk-free assets are defined as the sum of cash-like
assets and holdings of bonds. We consider two different measures of risk share. In the
first measurement, liquid assets are given by the sum of risk-free assets and the holdings
of stocks and mutual funds. Subtracting other liabilities from liquid assets yields liquid
wealth. As a result, risky assets is liquid wealth minus risk-free assets, and risky share is
the holdings of risky assets divided by liquid wealth. The second measurement uses financial
wealth, which is the sum of liquid wealth, equity in a private business, and home equity.
Accordingly, risky assets include the holdings of stocks and mutual funds, equity in a private
business, and home equity, and risky share is the holdings of risky assets divided by financial
wealth. Lastly, income in our paper is represented by labor income of households.
The PSID data set contains many household characteristics annually after 1997 and
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households’ asset holdings in years 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2001, and 2003. Thus, time-
series data about asset holdings are either 2-year apart or 5-year apart. Hence, we divide
the data into two subsamples: the 1984-1999 (k = 5) subsample and the 1999-2003 (k = 2)
subsample. We select households who hold at least $10,000 liquid wealth or at least $10,000
financial wealth in the last period, t− k. In addition, we require that the martial status of
the family unit head remained unchanged from t − k to t and that no assets were moved
in or out as a consequence of a family member moving into or out of family unit. Table 1
provides some summary statistics of three key variables, liquid wealth, financial wealth, and
income.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present the empirical results. We first investigate our benchmark model
with time-varying labor income that considers both the habit channel and the income chan-
nel, and the heterogeneity (the weak form of TVRRAI). We then explore the model that
considers both channels but with constant income (semi-strong form of TVRRAI).
4.1 Weak Form of TVRRAI
4.1.1 Methodology
To test our hypothesis, Inequality (2.9), we have to compare households’ current income
to their long run average in order to divide households in each subsample into two groups.
The 1999-2003 (k = 2) subsample does not provide such data to calculate the averages. As
a result, we only test the weak form of TVRRAI with the 1984-1999 (k = 5) subsample
by dividing the households in that subsample into two groups. In the first group, i = 1,
households’ current income is below a threshold ratio of their time-series averages. The
remaining households enter the second group, i = 2. In the benchmark exercise, we set the
threshold ratio at 30%. In the sensitivity analysis in in Appendix 1, we change the ratio
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from 20% to 50%.
For each group, we estimate the following equation
∆kα
i
t,j = β
iqit−k,j + γ
i∆kh
i
t,j + ρ
i∆kw
i
t,j − ϑiyit,j∆k
(
wit,j
)
+ εit,j, i = 1, 2. (4.1)
where qit−k,j is a vector of household characteristics and the fixed time effects for household
j in the i-th group. For example, it includes a broad range of variables related to the life
cycle, background, and financial situation of the household. The vector ∆kh
i
t,j contains
variables that capture major changes in household characteristic or asset ownership for the
i-th group. For example, it includes: changes in family size, changes in the number of
children, and sets of dummies for house ownership, business ownership, and nonzero labor
income at t and t − k. The inclusion of these additional variables serves the purpose of
controlling for some important econometric issues, such as life-cycle effects and preference
shifters, and idiosyncratic versus aggregate wealth changes.
We set yt = log(Yt). We use labor income in our empirical analysis of both liquid risky
shares and financial risky shares. Note that, labor income may not correspond to income in
our portfolio choice model if wealth means liquid wealth. Since we do not have the data for
the right choice of income in line with liquid wealth, our results associated with liquid risky
shares should be interpreted with caution.
Finally, comparing to Eq. (10) in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), we introduce the term
yt × ∆ (wt) in Eq. (4.1) in order to get the estimate of ρ. Since the additional term is
the only difference between Eq. (4.1) and Eq. (10) in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), all
econometric issues except the instruments that have been addressed in Brunnermeier and
Nagel (2008) are handled in the same way.
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4.1.2 Regression Results
We focus on reporting results on the response of risky shares to wealth fluctuations.9 The
main results about the weak form of TVRRAI are presented in Tables 2 and 3. In Table
2, we report the first-stage TSLS estimates. In Table 3, we report two OLS estimates,
OLS1 and OLS2, and the second stage TSLS estimate for both liquid risky shares and
financial risky shares. The difference between OLS1 and OLS2 is that OLS2 includes “Asset
composition controls” in the control variables. In particular, for the liquid asset share, asset
composition controls include: the labor income/liquid wealth ratio interacted with age, the
business wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and the housing wealth/liquid wealth ratio. For the
financial asset share, asset composition controls consist only of the labor income/financial
wealth ratio interacted with age. It immediately follows that a big portion of households in
our subsample suffered large negative income shocks. According to Table 2, 573 out of 1362
households in the 1984-1999 subsample, 42 percent, had the current income below 30% of
their time-average income.
From Table 3, we see that with the OLS estimates, the responses of both financial and
liquid risky shares to wealth fluctuations in the first group are smaller than the corresponding
responses in the second group and the differences are, in general, statistically significant.
For example, the difference between the responses of liquid risky shares, ρ’s, across groups is
0.144 percentage points if we use the OLS1 estimate. This finding provides some evidence of
TVRRA in the households’ portfolio choice data. Note that the OLS2 estimate associated
with liquid risky shares is not statistically different from zero. We do not interpret this
insignificant result as evidence against habit formation preferences. The reason is that our
practice of using labor income to denote the income from sources other than liquid wealth
seems to be problematic.
9For results about the stock market participation, please see Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008).
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Strong evidence comes from the two OLS estimates associated with financial risky shares.10
Both estimates associated with the bottom group are statistically significant. They are eco-
nomically significant as well: one is -0.967 percentage points and the other is -0.681 percent-
age points. According to our model, if we use financial risky shares, yt should denote the
income coming from sources other than financial assets. It seems reasonably to argue that
labor income is the right income to use. Since the relation between financial risky shares
and labor income in our empirical results is in line with the theoretical model, we believe
that two OLS estimates, both economically significant and statistically significant, provide
some evidence of TVRRA in the PSID data.
Nevertheless, it is well known that PSID data, micro-data from surveys, about wealth and
risky shares contain measurement errors and OLS estimates are thus inconsistent. To address
such an issue, we do two-stage least squares regressions. The identification requirement is
that the instruments, IV s, are (partially) correlated with ∆kwt, but not the error terms.
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) choose quantile dummies for income growth from t − k
to t (similar to Dynan (2000), in a different application), and inheritance receipts (as in
Meer et al. (2003)) between t − k and t as instruments. One reason is, as they argue,
that these instruments are based upon survey questions that are different from those for the
components of wt. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the elements of IV are uncorrelated
with measurement errors. Even though the choice of those instruments does not reject that
the instruments are uncorrelated with the regression residual, they are, in general, weak
instruments when we run our regressions. For example, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics
associated with the liquid risky shares and the financial asset shares in our TSLS regressions
using the the first group data are 2.863 and 5.825, respectively. In both cases, we cannot
reject the hypothesis of weak instruments at 25%. In the TSLS regressions using the the
second group data, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics associated with the liquid risky
10The OLS estimates associated with the top group are not significantly different from zero. Thus, we
focus on the estimates associated with the bottom group in which households suffered large negative income
shocks.
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shares and the financial risky shares are 10.871 and 6.439, respectively. We can only reject
the null hypothesis of weak instruments at 20% in the liquid risky shares case but not the
financial risky shares case. Unfortunately, the latter case is clearly the relevant case because
the relation between financial risky shares and labor income is in line with the theoretical
model as we have discussed.
To deal with the weak instrument issue, we choose different instruments. In particular,
our instrument, IV , is the difference between the growth rate of the household’s labor
income and the growth rate of the household’s liquid assets. For the formal definition of
the instrument, please see the note under Table 2. The results in the table show that the
instrument has a significant partial correlation with changes in log liquid wealth and changes
in log financial wealth. The partial R2 of the instrument is close to 1, which suggests that
the instrument explains a large fraction of variation in wealth changes. The instrument is
highly significant, with p-values smaller than 0.001 for each of the specifications. To see this,
note that F statistics are larger than the rule of thumb of ten suggested by Staiger and Stock
(1997).
The second stage TSLS regression results are reported in Table 3. The difference between
the response of liquid risky shares to wealth fluctuations in the first group is 1.369 percentage
points smaller than the corresponding response in the second group. The difference associ-
ated with financial risky shares is even larger, 6.341 percentage points. Both differences are
statistically significant and economically significant. Note that we have only one endogenous
regressor and one instrument in any of our regression specifications. Our specifications are
exactly identified and the p-values associated with the over-identification tests are always
almost zero. In addition, we observe F statistics above Stock and Yogo weak identification
critical values, rejecting the hypothesis that the IV is weak. In particular, the Cragg-Donald
Wald F statistics associated with the first group data are substantially larger than the 10%
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value; and those associated with the second group data are
substantially larger than the 15% Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value. Given that our
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instrument is strong and the differences are both statistically significant and economically
significant, we argue that, overall, the TSLS results do provide evidence of TVRRA since
they are in line with the theoretical predictions about relative risk aversion of a portfolio
choice model with habits.
As addressed in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), it is to be expected that the TSLS
estimator will lose precision compared with the OLS estimator. It is not clear that the TSLS
estimator will be closer to the true parameter in a mean-squared error sense. In realizing
this, we argue that if both OLS estimates and the TSLS estimate show the difference as
predicted by the portfolio choice model with habits, it is then reasonable to argue that there
is evidence of TVRRA in the PSID data. Our results associated with the financial risky
shares could thus be viewed as evidence of TVRRA. Still, note that the use of labor income
when wealth refers to liquid wealth may be an issue as we have discussed before.
In our sensitivity analysis, we change the 30% threshold value from 20% to 50% and we
obtain the similar evidence of TVRRA (Fig. 1). In each panel, the horizontal axis represents
the value we set for the threshold ratio that is used to divide the subsample into two groups.
In our empirical exercise, all ρ2’s are not significantly different from zero. Thus, we set them
to be zero and the vertical axis in Fig. 1 represents −ρ1. In the figure, OLS1 denotes the
the value of ρ1 associated with our first OLS estimates in our tables; OLS2 denotes the the
value of ρ1 associated with our second OLS estimates in our tables; and TSLS denotes the
the value of ρ1associated with our TSLS estimates in our tables. The results in panels (a)-(c)
hold at the 10% significant confidence interval and the results in panels (b)-(d) hold at the
5% significant confidence interval.
In summary, our hypothesis essentially implies that controlling for the response through
the income channel for each household and the heterogeneous responses through the habit
channel across households will help generate a positive increase of ρ from the i = 1 group to
the i = 2 group. Since our empirical results confirm such a hypothesis, we argue, in terms
of the testable theoretical predictions, that the weak form of habit formation preferences is
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supported by the PSID data. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that our conclusion builds
on a strong assumption that habits across households change roughly in the same fashion
over time.
4.2 Semi-strong Form of TVRRAI
To test the prediction, Inequality (2.10), we estimate the following equation for both sub-
samples
∆kαt,j = βqt−k,j + γ∆kht,j + ρ∆kwt,j − ϑyt,j∆kwt,j + εt,j, (4.2)
We deal with the instruments in the same way as we have done in the discussion of the weak
form of TVRRAI. We use labor income in our empirical analysis of both liquid risky shares
and financial risky shares. Since we do not have to calculate the averages in testing the
semi-strong form, we can use both the 1984-1999 subsample and the 1999-2003 subsample.
The main results are in Table 4. In general, we find no response of risky shares to
wealth fluctuations. For example, the liquid risky share decreases with liquid wealth in
the 1984-1999 subsample and has no response in the 1999-2003 subsample. The financial
risky share presents no response to financial wealth in both subsamples, except the TSLS
estimate associated with the 1984-1999 subsample. In contrast, Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2008) find generally negative response of the financial risky share to the wealth fluctuations.
To facilitate comparison, we present the test results about the strong form of TVRRAI in
Table 5 in which we replicate those in Tables 4 and 5 in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). In
particular, we estimate the following equation for both subsamples
∆kαt,j = βqt−k,j + γ∆kht,j + ρ∆kwt,j + εt,j, (4.3)
Note that our TSLS estimates are quite different from their TSLS estimates. The main
reason is that we use a different instrumental variable from theirs. We have discussed this
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point in detail above.
This comparison shows that controlling for the response through the income channel
raises the estimate of ρ, confirming the implication of our theoretical model with constant
labor income that omitting the impact of labor income channel biases downward the estimate
of ρ.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce time-varying labor income, an empirically important element,
into a portfolio choice model with external habits. The key theoretical contribution of our
paper is that our analytical solution adds the following new insights to the literature: (1)
risky shares respond to wealth fluctuations through two channels, habit and labor income;
(2) depending on whether they experience large negative income shocks or not, households
response differently through the habit channel; and (3) an internal mis-identification problem
arises if the two channels are considered as one channel, while an external mis-identification
problem arises if the heterogeneous responses across households are ignored.
Accordingly, we test the semi-strong form and the weak form of TVRRAI. Our empirical
contribution is that we find evidence of the weak form of TVRRAI. Our positive evidence
of the weak form of TVRRAI is clear evidence of TVRRA in the household level data. Our
refined results provide some confidence with respect to the use of habit formation preferences
in macro models. Even though our results reject the semi-strong form of TVRRAI, in line
with the rejection of the strong form of TVRRAI in the literature, our acceptance of the
weak form shows the importance of controlling for the internal and external mis-identification
problems. In addition, our analysis shows some potential of bridging the gap between the
success of macro models with habits and the previous negative evidence in micro data by
using more realistic theoretical models to identify the estimation.
Questions still remain. First, the effect of inertia on portfolio adjustments remains un-
changed from those in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), which casts reasonable doubt on the
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soundness of TVRRA. Thus, the strong asset allocation inertia identified in Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2008) remains an interesting and not well-understood phenomenon. Second, new
data have been issued. It is of interest to check the robustness with additional data and
this is on our future research agenda. Last, the relation between risky shares and wealth is
indeed highly nonlinear (see Eq. (2.4)). Our estimates from linear regressions may still be
biased. In a separate project, we develop non-linear estimates. By overcoming the biased
associated with the linear estimates when the underlying relation is highly nonlinear, we
further explore what additional insights we can obtain about the time-varying relative risk
aversion.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Tenth Ninetieth
Variables Mean percentile Median percentile N
All households, 1984-1999 (k=5)
Liquid wealth 158,213 1,063 53,774 351,004 3,262
Financial wealth 454,783 37,860 206,608 871,875 3,262
Income 93,216 25,051 73,417 160,810 3,262
All households, 1999-2003 (k=2)
Liquid wealth 203,697 16,981 63,843 402,042 3,005
Financial wealth 503,547 39,477 224,952 914,796 3,005
Income 100,238 27,215 77,011 174,170 3,003
Notes: Our summary statistics are slightly different from those in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). The
reason for the discrepancy is that we corrected several typos in their program.
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Table 2: First Stage Regressions: Weak Form of TVRRAI
k = 5 (1984–1999)
∆k log liquid wealtht ∆k log financial wealtht
Bottom 30% Top 70% Bottom 30% Top 70%
Instrumental Variable
IV -.031** .013** -.013** -.009**
(.005) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Explanatory variables:
Preference shifters
√ √ √ √
Life-cycle controls
√ √ √ √
Year-region FE
√ √ √ √
F statistics of instrument 36 15 27 13
[p-value] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00]
N 523 766 573 786
Notes: Define hdlabinc5 and lhdlabinc5 as the labor income in the current period and in the past period, fw
and lfw as the liquid wealth in the current period and in the past period, and svodbt and lsvodbt as the dollar
value of other debts in the current period and in the past period. The other debts are defined in the same way
as in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), which comprise nonmortgage debt such as credit card debt and consumer
loans. As a result, (fw+ svodbt) and (lfw+ lsvodbt) denote liquid assets in the current period and in the past
period, respectively. The instrumental variable, IV , is given by
IV = log(labfw/llabfw),
where labfw = hdlabinc5/(fw + svodbt) and llabfw = lhdlabinc5/(lfw + lsvodbt). Heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-robust standard errors are used to judge the significance of estimates. ** denotes the estimate
is statistically significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance level and * denotes that the estimate is
statistically different from 0 at the 10% significance level.
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Table 3: Changes in Risky Shares: Weak Form of TVRRAI
k = 5 (1984–1999)
Bottom 30% Top 70%
OLS1 OLS2 TSLS OLS1 OLS2 TSLS
Dependent variable:
Proportion of liquid wealth invested in stocks and mutual funds
Explanatory variablesa:
∆k log liquid wealtht -.304* -.268 -.786 -.160 -.205 .714
(.176) (.202) (.610) (.163) (.173) (1.357)
Asset composition controls
√ √
Preference shifters
√ √ √ √ √ √
Life-cycle controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Year-region FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Adj. R2 .11 .11 – .09 .10 –
Overidentification test – – [.00] – – [.00]
N 496 496 565 688 688 766
Dependent variable:
Proportion of financial wealth invested in stocks, mutual funds,
equity in a private business, and home equity
Explanatory variablesa:
∆k log financial wealtht -.967** -.681* -4.649** -.244 -.374 1.692
(.440) (.370) (1.606) (.472) (.601) (3.882)
Asset composition controls
√ √
Preference shifters
√ √ √ √ √ √
Life-cycle controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Year-region FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Adj. R2 .15 .17 – .20 .21 –
Overidentification test – – [.00] – – [.00]
N 502 502 573 704 704 786
Notes: Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are used to judge the significance of
estimates. ** denotes the estimate is statistically significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance level and
* denotes that the estimate is statistically different from 0 at the 10% significance level. The difference between
OLS1 and the OLS2 is that OLS2 includes “Asset composition controls” in the control variables. In particular,
asset composition controls for the liquid asset share include: the labor income/liquid wealth ratio interacted
with age, the business wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and the housing wealth/liquid wealth ratio. For the financial
asset share, asset composition controls consist only of the labor income/financial wealth ratio interacted with
age. The benchmark regression equation is given by
∆kα
i
t,j = β
iqit−k,j + γ
i∆kh
i
t,j + ρ
i∆kw
i
t,j − ϑiyit,j∆k
(
wit,j
)
+ εit,j , i = 1, 2.
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Table 4: Changes in Risky Shares: Semi-Strong Form of TVRRAI
k = 5 (1984–1999) k = 2(1999–2003)
OLS1 OLS2 TSLS OLS1 OLS2 TSLS
Dependent variable:
Proportion of liquid wealth invested in stocks and mutual funds
Explanatory variablesa:
∆k log liquid wealtht -.223** -.216* – .043 .007 –
(.114) (.121) – (.108) (.109) –
Asset composition controls
√ √
Preference shifters
√ √
–
√ √
–
Life-cycle controls
√ √
–
√ √
–
Year-region FE
√ √
–
√ √
–
Adj. R2 .05 .05 – .05 .05 –
Overidentification test – – – – – –
N 1,184 1,184 – 1,348 1,348 –
Dependent variable:
Proportion of financial wealth invested in stocks, mutual funds,
equity in a private business, and home equity
Explanatory variablesa:
∆k log financial wealtht -.514 -.465 -2.073 -.390 -.393 -1.685
(.347) (.406) (1.748) (.248) (.245) (2.199)
Asset composition controls
√ √
Preference shifters
√ √ √ √ √ √
Life-cycle controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Year-region FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Adj. R2 .13 .13 – .10 .10 –
Overidentification test – – [.00] – – [.00]
N 1,206 1,206 1,359 1,379 1,379 1,561
Notes: Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and p-values
in brackets. ** denotes the estimate is statistically significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance level
and * denotes that the estimate is statistically different from 0 at the 10% significance level. The difference
between the OLS1 and the OLS2 is that OLS2 includes “Asset composition controls” in the control variables.
In particular, asset composition controls for the liquid asset share include: the labor income/liquid wealth ratio
interacted with age, the business wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and the housing wealth/liquid wealth ratio. For the
financial asset share, asset composition controls consist only of the labor income/financial wealth ratio interacted
with age. The regression equation is given by
∆kαt,j = βqt−k,j + γ∆kht,j + ρ∆kwt,j − ϑyt,j∆kwt,j + εt,j .
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Table 5: Changes in the risky shares: Strong Form of TVRRAI: The Brunnermeier and
Nagel (2008) Results
k = 5 (1984–1999) k = 2(1999–2003)
OLS1 OLS2 TSLS OLS1 OLS2 TSLS
Dependent variable:
Proportion of liquid wealth invested in stocks and mutual funds
Explanatory variables:
∆k log liquid wealtht -.014** -.009 -.018 .023** .017 .039**
(.006) (.009) (.013) (.011) (.015) (.014)
Asset composition controls
√ √
Preference shifters
√ √ √ √ √ √
Life-cycle controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Year-region FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Adj. R2 .05 .05 – .04 .05 –
Overidentification test – – [.00] – – [.00]
N 1,236 1,236 1,397 1,454 1,454 1,648
Dependent variable:
Proportion of financial wealth invested in stocks, mutual funds,
equity in a private business, and home equity
Explanatory variables:
∆k log financial wealtht -.161** -.172* -.164** -.108** -.103** -.159**
(.059) (.091) (.025) (.031) (.036) (.028)
Asset composition controls
√ √
Preference shifters
√ √ √ √ √ √
Life-cycle controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Year-region FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Adj. R2 .16 .16 – .09 .09 –
Overidentification test – – [.00] – – [.00]
N 1,260 1,260 1,427 1,487 1,487 1,687
Notes: Table 5 replicates Tables 4 and 5 in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). Heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and p-values in brackets. ** denotes the
estimate is statistically significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance level and * denotes that the estimate
is statistically different from 0 at the 10% significance level. The difference between the OLS1 and the OLS2
is that OLS2 includes “Asset composition controls” in the control variables. In particular, asset composition
controls for the liquid asset share include: the labor income/liquid wealth ratio interacted with age, the business
wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and the housing wealth/liquid wealth ratio. For the financial asset share, asset
composition controls consist only of the labor income/financial wealth ratio interacted with age. The regression
equation is given by
∆kαt,j = βqt−k,j + γ∆kht,j + ρ∆kwt,j + εt,j .
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Figure 1: Sensitivity Analysis Results
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Notes: The horizontal axis represents the value we set for the threshold ratio that is used to divide the sample into
two groups. The vertical axis represents the difference between ρ2 and ρ1. In particular, if ρi is not statistically
different from zero, we set it at zero. OLS1 denotes the differences associated with our first OLS estimates in our
tables; OLS2 denotes the differences associated with our second OLS estimates in our tables; and TSLS denotes
the differences associated with our TSLS estimates in our tables. The results in panels (a)-(b) hold at the 10%
significant confidence interval and the results in panels (c)-(d) hold at the 5% significant confidence interval. Panels
(a)-(b) present the results associated with financial risky shares. Panels (c)-(d) present the results associated with
liquid risky shares.
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6 Appendix
6.1 The Derivation of Eq. (2.6)
Define W˜t = Wt − Ct and wt = log(W˜t), we can rewrite Eq. (2.5) as
αt = 1− X − Y
(Wt − Ct + Y )Rf = 1− f(wt).
where f(wt) =
X−Y
(ewt+Y )Rf
. We approximate f(wt) around a point, for example, the mean of
wealth w, up to the first order and obtain
f(wt) ≈ f(w) +
[
df(wt)
dwt
∣∣
wt=w
]
(wt − w)
= f(w) +
(X − Y )ew
(ew + Y )2Rf
w − (X − Y )e
w
(ew + Y )2Rf
wt
= f(w) + Θw −Θwt,
⇒ αt ≈ 1− [f(w) + Θw −Θwt]
= [1− f(w)−Θw] + Θwt,
where Θ = (X−Y )e
w
(ew+Y )2Rf
. Note the values of f(w), Θ, and w do not depend on time.
Take the first-order difference (over time) and we get
∆αt ≈ Θ∆wt = Xe
w
(ew + Y )2Rf
∆wt − Y e
w
(ew + Y )2Rf
∆wt
= ρ∆wt − θY∆wt,
where ρ = Xe
w
(ew+Y )2Rf
and θ = e
w
(ew+Y )2Rf
. This is exactly Eq. (2.6).
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